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69241 DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 EA-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07
L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12
IO-13 UPW-01 RSR-01 /126 W

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R 060735Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1200
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMCONSUL BOMBAY
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMCONSUL MADRAS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
RUE SRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 124

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SUBJECT: ICC LAOS

1. TIME OF INDIA JUNE 6 FEATURED REPORT ON "INDIAN BID REVIVE ICC VIENTIANE TO SAVE LAOS." IN ESSENCE, INDIA SAID MAKING UNSPECIFIED FRESH EFFORTS ACTIVATE ICC TO INHIBIT CAMBODIAN COMBAT SPILLOVER IN LAOS.

2. "WHETHER EFFORTS WILL YIELD RESULTS EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL SINCE COMMISSION CANNOT INTERVENE EFFECTIVELY UNLESS MEMBERS CANADA AND POLAND PERSUADED AGREE UPON COMMON APPROACH.

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PAGE 02 NEW DE 06614 061007Z
EM ZMAJORITY DECISION OBVIOUSLY HAS NOT MORAL IMPACT UNANIMOUS
VERDICTS.

4. "IF COMMISSION DEADLOCK CANNOT BE BROKEN, INDIA WILLING TAKE UP WITH BRITAIN AND USSR, IN HOPE THEY CAN BE PERSUADED USE INFLUENCE TO RESTORE ICC ROLE UNDER GENEVA AGREEMENTS.
5. "BEST WOULD BE IF COMMISSION AGREED TAKE COGNIZANCE OF TROOP MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LAOS IN CONTEXT CAMBODIAN FIGHTING. PRESENCE OF U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE GROUND FORCES IS ADMITTED BY THE TWO COUNTRIES, BUT THOSE OF OTHERS IS NOT.
6. "NORTH VIETNAMESE ACCORDING RLG ARE INVESTING STRATEGIC SARAVANE. THERE ALSO REPORTS OF ENCROACHMENTS INTO LAOS BY THAI TROOPS, WHILE FORCES OF PATHET LAO AND RLG HAVE BEEN DISREGARDING CEASE-FIRE LINES JOCKEYING FOR POSITIONS.
7. "THIS BUILDING INTO EXPLOSIVE SITUATION WHILE ICC IMMOBILIZED BY DIFFERENCES, STANDS BY IDLY.
8. "INDIAN ICC CHAIRMAN RECEIVED REQUEST FROM LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT MAY 9 TO NOTE THREAT TO SARAVANE WHICH LAOTIAN ARMY DID NOT HAVE MEANS TO REPULSE. ICC ACKNOWLEDGED REQUEST MAY 26 WITHOUT INDICATING ACTION.
9. SUCH INACTION DESTROYING LITTLE CREDIBILITY ICC STILL HAS. IMMOBILITY ALSO DAMAGING TO INDIA'S POSITION AS NEUTRAL AND IMPARTIAL OBSERVER. HENCE NEW DELHI ANXIETY THAT COMMISSION RESUME FUNCTIONS IT REQUIRED PERFORM UNDER GENEVA CHARTERS.
10. "RLG SAYS HANOI TRYING TURN AREA AROUND SARAVANE INTO SANCTUARY TO REPLACE LOSS OF CAMBODIAN. IT IS ALSO ALLEGED HANOI TROOP MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LAOS MEANT CREATE NEW HO CHI MINH TRAIL.
11. "THESE CHARGES HAVE PLAUSIBLE RING BECAUSE COMPULSIONS OF GEOGRAPHY IN INDO-CHINA STATES CANNOT ALLOW LAOS REMAIN UNAFFECTED BY BITTER FIGHTING VIET-NAM AND NEW CONFLICT CAMBODIA.
12. "BUT IDLE FOR RLG PROTEST ITS NEUTRALITY; TESTIMONY RECORDED BY U.S. SENATE'S FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE CLEARLY ESTABLISHES

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CIA

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PAGE 03 NEW DE 06614 061007Z
RLG'S CONCURRENCE IN U.S. STRIKES AGAINST PATHET LAO-HELD AREAS
AS WELL AS INTO NORTH VIET-NAM.

13. "IN TANGLED SITUATION ICC, CREATED SUPERVISE CEASE-FIRE WHICH
NO LONGER EXISTS, FINDS ITSELF COMPLETELY BYPASSED BY EVENTS. AS
NEW DELHI SEES IT, INDIA CANNOT DISOWN RESPONSIBILITIES AS LONG AS
COMMISSION CONTINUES TO EXIST."

COMMENT: MINISTRY EXTERNAL AFFAIRS JOINT SECRETARY GONSALVES
TOLD POLITICAL COUNSELOR JUNE 6 TIMES REPORT USUAL PRESS SPECULA-
TION. SAID GOI IS EXPLORING VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES BUT THERE NO
REPEAT NO FRESH BID AND SITUATION REMAINS ESSENTIALLY THAT REPORTED
PARA ELEVEN NEW DELHI 6426. ADDED THERE NO QUESTION OF REVIVAL
ICC LAOS, IT EXISTS, BUT HIGHLY ACADEMIS TO EXPECT ICC TO SAVE
LAOS.
STONE

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DETROIT, MICH.
NEWS

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JUN 4 1 1970

Work of CIA hampered by 'leper' image

By COL. R. D. HEINL JR.
News Military Analyst

WASHINGTON — The Agency for International Development (AID) is a cover for the CIA in Laos and wishes it weren't.

Since 1962, according to its administrator, John A. Hannah, the mission in Vientiane has maintained a "rural development" division which is in fact a CIA front for training individuals and units in counter insurgency and other military skills.

Expressing the hope that the relationship between AID and CIA could be severed by legislation now pending, Hannah expressed distaste for working with the CIA. "Our preference is to get out of this kind of operation," he said.

If Hannah succeeds in divorcing AID and CIA, his agency will then make common cause with the Peace Corps, which has always held itself off-limits to the murky—but vitally necessary—game of intelligence.

THE ATTITUDE taken by Hannah, as well as by two former Peace Corps directors, Sargent Shriver and Jack

Hood Vaughan, and the present director, Joseph H. Blatchford, is that their agencies are or ought to be too pure to dirty their hands with intelligence matters. It infers that such work should be left to the CIA which, in the inference, comes through as a crew of amoral tricksters and warmongers.

The increasing desire of various agencies of the government to turn their back on the CIA (AID and the Peace Corps are not alone) hinders and obstructs the CIA in performing crucially important functions on which the survival of the United States literally depends.

Like Hannah's AID and Blatchford's Peace Corps, Richard Helm's CIA is a statutory agency of the United States, provided for by Congress and paid for from the public treasury. Whether or not given individuals, or even other government agencies, applaud the kind of work CIA sometimes does, the fact remains that CIA business is government business—no less than AID business—and usually a good bit more important.

Yet the stance of AID and the Peace Corps suggests that there is a kind of pousse-cafe stratification of government functions: some at the top above-board, pure, disinterested, moral in the Wilsonian

view of international relations being suitable and "respectable." Others in the dark depths disingenuous, amoral if not immoral, covert, and selfishly pro-American, being "disrespectable."

Obviously, AID would not want its acronym tarnished by disrespectful associations inside our government—and that is why Hannah withdraws the hem of his garment.

IN ITS EARLY DAYS as Col. Donovan's Office of Strategic Services (OSS), during World War II, our pre-CIA intelligence organization planted representatives at any point in the governmental structure where results could best be attained. Since World War II was a patriotic, "moral" war, no objections were raised. Nor, for the same reason, during the Korean War, was there any tendency on the part of U.S. government agencies to shun CIA.

It is only because of the domestic unpopularity of Vietnam and a simplistic view of government and its interests and their defense, that organizations like AID and the Peace Corps conclude that they should be allowed to refuse government business that some internal opinion disapproves.

This notion—that government agencies paid for by the taxpayer can pick and choose the kind of work they take in—is a philosophical sibling to the doctrine so popular in intellectual and even some judicial circles: that people enjoy the "right" to choose which wars they will fight and which they will sit out.

As a practical matter, it hardly requires a manpower expert to recognize that the "right" of selective service (in which the individual selects his own wars), means that the day the bugle blows will never be the day for a lot of high-minded young men to go to that particular war. Strictly on principle, you understand.

IN THE SAME WAY, if various government agencies acquire the discretion to cold-shoulder the CIA for the sake of convenience, or because agency of image, administrative officials are lukewarm on a particular tenet of defense or foreign policy, then some fine morning when the President

needs an answer badly, the CIA may not be able to produce.

Such a situation would be pleasing in Moscow, Peking, Cairo, Damascus, and very likely in Berkeley or Cambridge, but perhaps not so much so to high-minded, decent men like Hannah, who has served as an assistant secretary of defense and should know better.

Before he disdains the CIA and its work, Hannah might look back to an earlier American, Nathan Hale, who, when reproached in 1775 by a friend for "dirtying himself" by spying within the British lines, replied: "Every kind of service necessary to the public good, becomes honorable by being necessary."

June 8, 1970

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

"loses money" is a subjective interpretation of some old, over-generalized figures that the Post Office Department has publicly declared to be obsolete and invalid. Postmaster General Blount has stated on numerous occasions that Third Class Bulk mail is a desirable, positive contributor to the economic efficiency of the postal operation. This statement is supported by the Department's Revenue and Cost Analysis report issued on April 6 of this year. The report shows that revenue from Third Class Bulk mail exceeds its handling cost by 98% whereas the revenue from First Class mail exceeds its respective handling cost by only 85%. The same report also shows that Third Class Bulk is the most profitable major class of mail handled by the Post Office.

To go a step further, Assistant Postmaster General James W. Hargrove stated on April 13 of this year that, if Third Class Bulk mail did not exist, then the 296 million dollars in gross profit which it produced in fiscal 1969 would have had to come from some other source. He added that there are only two alternatives for "that other source"—either a congressional subsidy or an increase in First Class postage rates.

With these thoughts in mind, I certainly hope that you will reconsider your present position on this subject. When I served as one of your county chairman in the 1968 Senatorial Campaign, I had complete conviction of your unquestioned integrity, objectivity, and tireless effort to seek out and weigh all of the facts before acting on any issue. I'm sure that this personal involvement with your past efforts tends to heighten my awareness and concern in regard to some of your more recent activities. However, I certainly hope (and must assume) that these inconsistencies do not represent your considered personal position but are simply over-zealous campaign efforts which were produced by well intentioned supporters.

The voters of Iowa's First District rightfully look to both you and your opponents for information and interpretation on vital issues. I am sure that you constantly strive to fulfill this obligation in the most straight forward and unbiased manner possible and hope that the information which I have offered will be of assistance to you in this effort. Enclosed you will find some further details which may be of interest in exploring the subject of Third Class postal economics.

Sincerely,

MIKE MCSWEENEY.

U.S. POLICY IN LAOS STRENGTHENS
THE COMMUNISTS**HON. DONALD M. FRASER**

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 8, 1970

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, in the midst of public concern over President Nixon's invasion of Cambodia, we must not forget the quiet war of escalation the administration has been conducting in Laos throughout 1969 and 1970.

I wish to bring to the attention of the Congress excerpts from four articles from the Far Eastern Economic Review which describe how Vietnamization, a reduction in U.S. ground troops in Vietnam, has resulted in an escalatory use of weapons of mass destruction in Laos.

As these articles point out, massive devastation of civilian life and property has drastically altered the fragile politics of neutrality in Laos. The Pathet Lao

has become the only viable indigenous political force capable of providing leadership for thousands of dislocated and poverty stricken peasants.

I ask, Mr. Speaker, is this the course the President will now take in Cambodia after the withdrawal of U.S. troops on June 30? If so, he must be warned that indiscriminate bombing, use of chemicals, and other forms of massive civilian destruction create the social conditions which invite resistance and the growth of communism.

The excerpts from the four articles follow:

WASHINGTON'S DILEMMA

(By Arnold Abrams)

Ironically, those most in the dark about Laos are the American people. More than simply being unaware of the scope of U.S. operations here, they have yet to be told by their government that their nation is militarily involved in Laos. American officials still seek to officially conceal U.S. violations of the 1962 Geneva Accord, which bars all forms of foreign military intervention in Laos. They contend that Hanoi's refusal to concede the presence of North Vietnamese troops here makes it diplomatically unfeasible for Washington to act otherwise.

Consequently, everyone in Vientiane, from the Russian ambassador to the *mamasan* of the legendary White Rose, knows what the Americans are doing here. But the American public remains ignorant of the fact that their government is arming, training, supplying, transporting and directing approximately 70,000 Laotian troops in a war which threatens to get out of hand.

Instead of setting the record at least partially straight, U.S. officials here do things like allowing Vang Pao to declare recently, before a sizable contingent of visiting journalists, that his Meo forces fight with antiquated weapons, inadequate communications and inconsequential American support. As he was speaking, American F-4 Phantom jets roared overhead, several American observation planes were parked nearby and three cargo-laden American transport planes landed in quick succession at his official Sam Thong base. After denying he even received indirect U.S. military support, Vang Pao calmly climbed into an unmarked American helicopter, guarded by Laotians carrying American-made M-16 automatic rifles, and was flown back to his secret Long Cheng headquarters by a three-man American crew.

Vang Pao and official verbiage notwithstanding, American involvement in the Laotian conflict takes the following principal forms: In addition to 75 military advisers listed as embassy "attachés," about 300 men are employed in a variety of clandestine military activities supervised by the CIA. Although technically civilians, many CIA agents in Laos are former Special Forces soldiers recruited because of military expertise and Vietnam experience.

These ex-Green Berets train government troops, assist wide-ranging reconnaissance teams and plan guerrilla and psychological warfare operations. They wear combat fatigues and work out of three main camps, where they administer rigorous training in jungle warfare, guerrilla tactics, communications handling and weaponry.

The CIA also maintains and largely controls Vang Pao's army of approximately 15,000 fulltime troops. Officials instructions to the contrary, CIA personnel occasionally accompany these forces no combat forays. More than 20 agents have been killed in Laos. Among the most recent CIA casualties was Phil Werbisky, a former Special Forces captain widely known for his exploits during the

early days of Vietnam. He was killed in the government's late-summer offensive.

"These guys are tigers," says an American personally acquainted with many CIA agents in Laos. "They're tough, intelligent guys who know how to handle themselves. They're not afraid to mix it up out in the jungle." The American is a civilian engineer who befriended many agents while helping to build airstrips on several of their remote outposts. "They came to Laos because they were fed up with having their hands tied in Vietnam," he says. "Here they're doing things the way they want to, and getting better pay for it as well."

An important CIA adjunct in Laos has the innocuous title of "Requirements Office". It is staffed by about 90 men, most of whom also are ex-military types. Their function may be inconspicuous, but it is not innocuous. Stationed at field level, requirements officers—called ROs—handle the distribution of arms and ammunition, as well as general logistics. They are vital to any military operation mounted by the government.

Learning about these activities prompted Senator Fulbright to raise a key question about the CIA's role here: since its function ostensibly is to gather information, why is this agency running a war in Laos? "I don't approve of this kind of activity at all," Fulbright said. "But if it is in the national security interest to do this, it seems to me it ought to be done by regular US army forces and not by an intelligence-gathering agency." He added that the National Security Act, which created the CIA, "never contemplated this function" for the agency.

The CIA mission chief in Laos is Lawrence Devlin, listed as a "political officer" in the US Embassy. Unlike most political officers, however, Devlin flatly refuses to see reporters. For all anybody knows, he might agree on that last point with Senator Fulbright, who stressed that he was not criticising the CIA. "The agency is just following orders," Fulbright said.

Cargo and military supplies—as well as personnel—are ferried throughout Laos by Air America and Continental Air Services, private charter firms under contract to the US government. They are better known as the "CIA Airlines", and most of their pilots are ex-air force officers. Reporters are allowed to accompany flights involving rice drops to refugee camps, but are banned when military cargoes are carried.

"Why do you guys always ask about weapons and ammo shipments?" pilot Jim Walsh asked me. Walsh, 38, is an ex-air force officer who has worked in Laos for Air America since 1962. "You know we're not allowed to talk about such things," he said.

Another form of American air service in Laos constitutes the most direct US involvement in the fighting. Under the euphemism of "armed reconnaissance flights", Thailand-based American jets and bombers have mounted aerial bombardments equal to the pounding taken by North Vietnam prior to the bombing halt in 1968. The Ho Chi Minh trail in southeast Laos has been the prime target of American air attacks, but enemy encampments and troops on the Plain of Jars came under heavy fire during the recent government offensive.

Money for many US operations in Laos is cloaked in the budget of the mammoth Agency for International Development, or channelled through other unobtrusive conduits. The scope of American financial support of the neutralist Royal Lao government testifies to the effectiveness of such cover. Total American assistance here is reliably estimated at between US \$250 million and \$300 million per year. Of that, only the technical aid budget—about \$60 million—is made public. The rest, undisclosed, goes almost entirely for military purposes.

E 5352

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — Extensions of Remarks

June 8, 1970

ONE YEAR WORSE
(By T. D. Aliman)

The situation in Laos is not particularly encouraging for either side—for the Americans who have dropped hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs to prop up the Vientiane government, or for the North Vietnamese, who have invested tens of thousands of troops in a so-far futile effort to force Prince Souvanna Phouma's government to follow more acquiescent policies.

Almost paradoxically, both sides have begun the present dry season, which marks the annual upswing in fighting, in weaker positions than they held six months or a year ago. Both sides seem as far away as ever from achieving their goals in Laos. And the country is victim of an escalating level of violence that so far has maintained the rough balance of territorial power only at an ever higher cost in Laotian lives, property and hope of finding some way out of the Vietnam war.

Indeed, as Laos enters its sixth full year of war since the break-up of the coalition government and escalation of the war in South Vietnam, nothing seems to have turned out the way anyone wanted it. The North Vietnamese hoped to use Laos as an unimpeded funnel to victory in South Vietnam. When the Vientiane government permitted the Americans to start the bombing, the North Vietnamese committed increasing amounts of troops in an effort to discredit that government. This they have succeeded in doing, at least militarily, time after time, but the U.S. bombing has only increased.

The Americans began the bombing with some hope of keeping the war from spreading deep into the territory of an increasingly dependent Vientiane government. But jet bombers cannot stop ambushes; they are of relatively little use even in medium-sized engagements. As a result, American bombs have been able to drive the communists of the Plain of Jars and have constantly harassed traffic along the Ho Chi Minh trail. But nothing the Americans can do, short of moving their own ground troops into Laos, can prevent the communists from disrupting normal commerce and government in the Mekong valley. Similarly, communist raids and larger attacks can discredit the Vientiane government's pretensions to effective authority but they cannot stop the American bombing.

Thus neither North Vietnam nor the United States have found the short-cut to victory in South Vietnam that they sought in violations of Laotian neutrality. The Laotians, on both sides, have suffered heavily. Probably neither the Americans nor the North Vietnamese originally anticipated that the Laotian war would involve them so deeply, and turn out to be so inconclusive.

There now is some debate in Vientiane on when the communists will finally be able to get their Plain of Jars counter-offensive going, and when they do, whether it will force the United States into another escalation, such as the use of B-52 bombers for the first time in large numbers outside the Ho Chi Minh trail.

But in contrast to a year ago, there is now absolute unanimity among all observers, of all persuasions, that an end to the Laos war is impossible until after the end of the Vietnam war, whenever that may come, and that the prognosis for Laos in 1970, and indeed for a long time after that, is for more—perhaps much more—of the same.

LAOS: SHADES OF LBJ
(By T. D. Aliman)

VIENTIANE.—Two expressions—"escalation" and "credibility gap"—may well be on the way to having the same dark significance for President Nixon that they had for his predecessor, Lyndon Johnson's fruitless up-

pings of the ante in South Vietnam in pursuit of an illusory military victory, and his compulsive lack of candour on the effects and motives of that policy carried him from the greatest plurality in the history of presidential elections to political oblivion four years later.

This time the president appears less egomaniac; the country is Laos, not Vietnam; and Richard Nixon still has many, many mistakes to make before he turns into the Lear-like figure that Johnson has become.

But mistakes are being made in Laos, and they became more obvious after Nixon's recent nationwide address on Laos. It was supposed to tell all, but it wound up being undeniably—and probably deliberately—cavalier with the facts about the disguised war the US is fighting in Laos.

The major fact Nixon apparently wished to conceal was that the US war effort in Laos had increased greatly since November 1968 when the bombing halt in North Vietnam resulted in an almost automatic escalation of bombing in Laos. He said reports that the increase in "our air activity has had the effect of escalating the conflict" were "grossly inaccurate."

The fact remains that US bombing sorties over Laos have risen from an average 4-5,000 a month to 15-18,000 today. The fact remains that the US now is bombing whole areas of Laos it did not touch before, including the Plain of Jars. The fact remains that the US has expanded its policy of systematically denuding the Communist-held areas of Laos by moving in, taking out the civilian population, destroying all stocks of food and defoliating productive land. It is also a fact that US personnel—including advisers, planners, transport pilots and American gunship crews—are more deeply involved in fighting the Laotians' war for them than ever before.

Nixon, of course, went on television to defend his policy, not to pick it apart. The speech, obviously aimed squarely at Middle America, was an attempt to win political approval for what is going on in Laos. With increasing disquiet expressed in the US Congress and the press about the US war effort in Laos, the President could be excused for emphasizing the logic behind his own Laos policy—even if it meant trying to lay all the blame for the unhappy state of affairs in Laos on Hanoi's doorstep. But the President can hardly be excused for saying things that even US officials here have had to concede, just aren't right. Among the Nixonian departures from reality:

The President said there were 67,000 North Vietnamese troops in Laos, up from 55,000 in mid-1969. The US embassy here, despite its enthusiasm for the task, can find only 50,000 North Vietnamese troops, an increase from the 47,000 figure estimated in the middle of last year.

He said a total of 1,040 Americans work for the US government in Laos, directly or indirectly, of which 643 are involved in some military or logistics capacity. A paragraph later, he said: "US personnel in Laos during the past year has not increased . . ." But only last September, in another administration statement supposed to tell all about Laos, the US State Department said that only 833 Americans were working in Laos. Had the total number of Americans in Laos actually increased from 833 to 1,040—a rise of almost 25%? Or was the State Department wrong? Or the president?

Most disturbing, reliable sources here say the total of US personnel directly supporting the Vietnamese government's war effort is really much higher than 643, more like 1,000, if one includes "temporary duty personnel", and military and logistics personnel who spend the day in Laos but sleep at night at US bases in Thailand and Vietnam. None of the figures—the State Department's, the president's or those knowledgeable sources in Laos—include the tens of thousands of Amer-

icans who support the mammoth US bombing operation in Laos from bases in Thailand, Vietnam and Guam.

Nixon said: "No American stationed in Laos has ever been killed in ground combat operations." Although the phrasing is highly restrictive—most of the Laos war is fought from outside Laos by US personnel not stationed there—it is well known in Vientiane that many Americans have been killed in combat situations in Laos, and that their deaths, in South Vietnam, would be counted as combat casualties. Informed sources here—recalling that Americans killed in Laos are often shipped out on special planes without legal formalities in order to avoid publicity—estimate that about 150 Americans are killed each year in the Laos war, the vast majority of them pilots shot down on bombing missions. The president's contention that no American lives are being spent in Laos, of all his experiments with the truth, may be the one that comes back to haunt him the most as more and more Americans—mostly the families of civilian Air America pilots and US Air Force officers—receive death telegrams from Washington.

Perhaps most importantly, the president sought to camouflage the major changes that have occurred in the US policy in Laos over the last year by averring that American expansion of its war role in Laos has occurred "only when requested by the Laotian government". He also said: "The level of our air operations has been increased only as the number of North Vietnamese in Laos and the level of their aggression has increased."

In fact, observers here point out, the initial US air escalation in Laos, which occurred during late 1968 and early 1969, happened when there was no communist threat of noticeably increased proportions. Indeed, the aerial escalation did not occur because of special events in Laos, but because the US bombing halt in North Vietnam for the first time permitted the focus of the US air arsenal to shift to Laos. And perhaps, the crucial point, long-time observers here say, is that until a year ago Laotian requests for an escalation of the US bombing and logistics effort were rejected as a matter of a long-established policy of keeping the US involvement in Laos as low profile as possible.

That policy has changed, and the Nixon administration clearly is no longer interested in keeping a particularly low profile in Laos, despite the overall thrust of the Nixon Doctrine. The underlying reasons for the change is Laos policy are not hard to discern: "The US is deescalating downstream in South Vietnam," a Vientiane diplomat recently observed. "It is only natural that it should escalate upstream in Laos, especially on the Ho Chi Minh Trail."

The American bombing of communist infiltration routes in Laos, in fact, will be one of the few controls the US will retain over events in South Vietnam as Vietnamisation proceeds. The effectiveness of the bombing is debatable. But the President clearly does not wish to relinquish it while he is surrendering so many other options in South Vietnam.

Indeed, from all appearances, U.S. policymakers see the U.S. bombing in Laos as one of the keys to escape from the whole Indochina labyrinth. If the bombing can control the flow of North Vietnamese soldiers and supplies into South Vietnam, Vietnamisation will have a better chance of success, and the U.S. will be well on its way out of the war.

Of course, the train of cause and effect in international affairs is seldom so simple, and the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao have expressed their displeasure at the increase of bombing by continuing their attacks against government positions in Laos. They are using more men than ever before in the current dry season offensive—though the rise in number of North Vietnamese troops in Laos does not constitute the escalation Presi-

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E 5353

dent Nixon charged so much as a need to protect the Plain of Jars flank which the U.S. and Laotians for the first time attacked last year.

If the communists continue, as they have in the past, to win more and more ground in Laos, the government of Prince Souvanna Phouma could fall, or be forced to make concession to the communists, such as calling for a U.S. bombing halt. This, of course, would undermine the whole American effort to get out of South Vietnam gracefully, and so the Nixon administration has gone to escalated lengths to preserve the Vientiane government from a string of communist defeats.

THE LABYRINTHINE WAR

In 1953 the Vietminh launched an offensive into Laos. This forced the French to make an unpalatable choice; either attempt to hold on to Laos or, as military sense dictated, withdraw and concentrate forces on the Vietnamese coastal plains. The French chose the former—and Dienbienphu and disaster soon followed.

Now, in 1970, a white foreign power fighting to maintain its position in Laos and Vietnam may soon be faced with a similar decision. If current communist military activities continued, the U.S. will have to decide whether to become more involved in Laos or make political and military concessions it has not yet been willing to consider.

It is still too early to say where the pendulum will swing. But one thing is clear: the U.S. and the Royal Lao Government are on the defensive. If the communists decide to continue their offensive—however large and whoever is leading—it is not likely to be contained without substantial military escalation or significant concessions on the part of the Americans.

For the past two years the U.S. has carried out one of the most sustained bombing campaigns in history against essentially civilian targets in northeastern Laos. The area is a carpet of forest dotted by villages and a few towns. Refugees report that the bombing was primarily directed against their villages. Operating from Thai bases and from aircraft carriers, American jets have destroyed the great majority of villages and towns in the northeast. Severe casualties have been inflicted upon the inhabitants of the region, rice fields have been burned, and roads torn up. Refugees from the Plain of Jars report they were bombed almost daily by American jets last year. They say they spent most of the past two years living in caves or holes.

The basic aim of this bombing has been to hurt communist forces in every possible way: to deprive them of villages which could provide them with shelter, of manpower which could be used as porters or rice growers, to limit food supplies and road travel and to demoralise.

It seems probable, however, that this attempt to "raise the ante" has worked only too well. Militarily the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese seem to be as strong as ever.

The ineffectiveness of American airpower is highlighted in a comparison of the communist offensives against the Plain of Jars in 1964 and 1970. It took them three days to take it six years ago. This year, despite the massive American air support for government forces, it took five days.

Perched on the plain, communist forces could move in any or all of three directions. They could push west to Route 13, then move south toward Vang Vieng. Pathet Lao forces include a number of former neutralist battalions, currently commanded by General Deuane. The Pathet Lao claim that these represent the real neutralists. By taking

Vang Vieng they would be recapturing territory belonging to the Kong Le neutralists in 1962 and could then claim it in the name of their own "patriotic neutralist" forces.

They might move southwest in an attempt to take Long Cheng and Sam Thong. Long Cheng is the major US military base in northeast Laos. Recently visited by journalists for the first time, they reported seeing the longest runway in northern Laos, big helicopters used for rescuing downed American pilots in northern Laos, and American planes landing and taking off every minute. Sam Thong, seven miles away by air, is a centre for airlifting arms, food and medical supplies to Meo villages organised into paramilitary outposts. These are located on mountain tops and can be supplied only from the air. Long Cheng and Sam Thong constitute the logistics and air support centre for military activities throughout the northeast. Both are relatively easy to defend, being surrounded by hills on all sides. If the communists are willing to pay the price, however, there seems little doubt that they could capture both; this would mean a major military defeat for government forces.

A third though less likely possibility is that the communists may move southeast and attempt to take Paksane, a Mekong river town. Militarily this would be relatively easy but it might risk Thai involvement and conceivably, American ground intervention. It also seems unlikely that communist forces could hold Paksane for very long.

Whatever direction they choose to move, a communist offensive from the plain could place the US in a most difficult position. Airpower would be unlikely to halt their advance. Neither would the Royal Lao Army or the CIA-directed Clandestine Army.

The 60,000-man Royal Lao Army is made up primarily of village youths conscripted to fight in a war they neither understand nor desire. A private's salary is about US\$5 a month. Government soldiers have shown a marked—and one suspects rather astute—disposition for retreat during major battles. Corruption and indifference is rife in the officers corps. American military attaches complain constantly that the only advice Lao army officers seek from them is in preparing escape plans. During the last battle for the plain government soldiers complained that they had been fenced in by barbed wire to prevent their retreat.

The Meo soldiers—and Thai, Burmese and Cambodian mercenaries of the Clandestine Army—tend to be more aggressive than regular troops. A private is paid more than US\$30 a month and is better equipped and trained. Their strength is about 6,000 in northeastern Laos and 6,000 in the rest of the country. However, as an American official delicately put it, the Meos are "better at attacking than defending". The fact is that they are basically a group of guerrillas, effective at harassing and small actions but simply not designed to function as a regular army. The most serious problem with Vang Pao's Meo soldiers is their lack of discipline. Laotian refugees complain bitterly of mistreatment by Meo soldiers during their capture of the plain last September. Refugees say the Meos slaughtered hundreds of cows and buffaloes, destroyed many of their shelters and looted their belongings.

The only real military options left to the US should a major communist thrust develop are the introduction of American ground troops or support of a Thai invasion into Laos.

At present, neither seems very likely. Laos is simply not a vital enough interest for the US to introduce ground troops, particularly after nine years of Vietnam. And support of

Thai troops in Laos might in the end prove more complicated and costly than sending in American troops. Despite periodic beatings at SEATO conferences and other occasions, the Thais are not very anxious to confront the North Vietnamese army face to face. And few Americans here believe that if they did they would make a particularly good showing.

A successful communist push in Laos would probably result in major political and military concessions on the part of the US.

This would seem to be the communist goal. Few informed observers here believe that the communists plan to take over Laos in the near future. American military attaches, the first to ascribe aggressive motives to the North Vietnamese, have stated publicly that they do not believe that the North Vietnamese are intent on "colonising" Laos.

The first priority for the communists would probably be to force the US to stop its bombing of both the Ho Chi Minh trail and northern Laos. A second would be to give greatly increased strength to the Pathet Lao within the framework of a coalition government.

A third, and intriguing, possibility is that a communist offensive in Laos may be designed to force a faster rate of American troop withdrawal from South Vietnam. A major thrust which seemed on the point of taking over all of Laos would place the US in an untenable position. It might well be that in such a case the Americans would be prepared to swap a faster withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam in return for some firm communist guarantees of neutral status for Laos.

Such speculations point up the basic weakness of the American position in Laos. Over the past five years Royal Lao Government control has gradually been eroded. Most of Laos is either a no-man's land or is controlled by the Pathet Lao. A successful communist offensive would shrink government control even further. This weakness was implicit in President Richard Nixon's March 8 statement on Laos. By appealing to the Russians—who are unlikely to have either the inclination or capability to slow a Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese advance into Laos—the president seemed to imply that American ability to contain communist forces in Laos is limited.

Perhaps most significantly, American military priorities have prevented any strengthening of the Royal Lao Government. Its corruption, lethargy and indifference is as great if not greater than it ever was. Few people living under its rule actively support it. American officials have been unable to push for basic reforms due to the political necessity of getting on with the Lao civilian and military elite so that continued American bombing will be permitted.

Laos is not Vietnam: U.S. deaths here are counted in the hundreds—mostly downed pilots and crew—not tens of thousands. And expenses are measured in hundreds of millions of dollars, not billions. But if Vietnam is America's quagmire, Laos is its labyrinth.

It seems clear at this point that the only path out leads through agreement on some sort of political settlement. The Americans simply do not have enough usable military power to force a favourable military situation. The U.S. will not find the concessions necessary to bring peace to Laos very pleasant. At the least, it will involve a suspension of all bombing in Laos and acceptance of a truly non-aligned Vientiane government. And it may involve trading complete and relatively rapid withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam for a guarantee of Laotian neutrality.

June 8, 1970

STATUS REPORT ON THE BRITISH-FRENCH CONCORDE

HON. HENRY S. REUSS

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 8, 1970

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, the London Economist for May 30, 1970, contained an interesting article on the British-French Concorde supersonic transport.

There is "increasing airline dissatisfaction" with the Concorde, the article says. The airlines say the plane is too small, the article goes on, and "they expect to make a loss on Concorde, however, they fly it."

Furthermore, the crucial trials of the Concorde at cruising speed have been delayed. These trials will test two points where the Concorde is most vulnerable—fuel consumption and the aerodynamics of its wing. According to the Economist:

If either behaves fractionally less well than it should, so that it takes more power to push the aircraft, or more fuel to keep the engines up to the mark, then crossing the North Atlantic could be impossible for the Concorde.

I include the Economist article in the RECORD at this point:

WHAT TO DO WITH CONCORDE: SHOULD THE NEXT GOVERNMENT IN BRITAIN CONSIDER A MAJOR REDESIGN OF THE CONCORDE AIR-LINER?

The formal announcement in a white paper* on Wednesday that all supersonic flying will be banned over Britain is important because it put on the record what everyone has assumed was bound to happen. It is a decision all reasonably developed countries are expected sooner or later to take. In the United States, already acutely pollution-conscious, the British lead will stiffen the political opposition to the American supersonic programme. That opposition has gained momentum this year. Support for America's proposed supersonic airliner (SST) had never been cordial. But this year the amount of money required has jumped sharply, to \$290 million. This has coincided with growing reports that the Boeing design is altering for the worse—with its weight going up and its performance going down, just as on the first prototype abandoned early last year. It has also coincided with reports of increasing airline dis-

satisfaction with Concorde, which has made Americans less afraid of the possibility that Concorde would sweep the American market and make huge inroads into the balance of payments, although the Department of Transportation still says it will.

The result is that the American SST's budget has been scraping through its various congressional stages by increasingly and uncomfortably narrow votes. On Wednesday, the House of Representatives finally passed it without cuts but might have been rougher had the Russians not helpfully flown their supersonic transport at its designed speed of twice the speed of sound for the first time on Tuesday. But the SST's budget still has to go through the Senate, where the opposition is tougher and better organised, and where some pessimists in the aviation press are even beginning to suspect that it could be voted down altogether.

If the American programme is visibly in trouble, is this the time for the next British government to get together with the French and talk seriously about whether they should concede some airlines' request to redesign Concorde—since there could now be less urgency about putting it into the market before an American competitor and more to be gained from offering an aircraft with improved performance? The present complaint is that Concorde is too small. The two manufacturers are currently proposing that airlines should reduce the seats in it to 110; and fly it as an all-first class service, charging first class or marginally less than first class fares (which on the North Atlantic are high: £213 return). On the manufacturers' figures, this would show a profit; on the airlines' calculations, it would not. They expect to make a loss on Concorde however they fly it.

The proposal that has been put by some airlines is that Concorde's fuselage should be widened so that an extra row of seats can be run down its length. This would increase the seating from four to five abreast and get numbers up closer to 200. Technically, this would be easy to do, and it also looks as if it might even improve flying performance by giving the aircraft a bigger surface area. It is not thought, at this preliminary stage, that it would involve any of those costly changes to the wing that lengthening the fuselage would. Lengthening Concorde's fuselage, without also changing the wings, would make the fuselage stick out at the back and wag dangerously. It is a ploy to be avoided in a narrow, delta-shaped aircraft.

The Government appeared to set its face against late major changes 12 months ago. It said that if Concorde costs were to rise more than 15 per cent above the estimated £730 million it was then taking to develop—a figure which still holds, thanks to the

effects of French devaluation—this would be tantamount to a major redesign. The unspoken implication was that Mr. Wilson was unwilling to agree to go back to the drawing board. But 15 per cent of £730 million is over 100 million. And engineers believe that the proposed modification of the fuselage could be kept within £100 million.

There are two catches. The most obvious is that only the naive are still prepared to accept estimates by the aircraft industry, here or in the United States. But the more important one is that Concorde has not, unlike the Soviet SST, yet flown at twice the speed of sound. It should have been doing so any time now. Instead it has been grounded for a variety of reasons; most obviously strikes at Bristol (see page 61). These trials at cruising speed are crucial. No amount of work in wind tunnels and on computers can substitute for them. They will test the two points where Concorde is most vulnerable: the fuel consumption of its engines at normal cruising, and the aerodynamics of its wing. If either behaves fractionally less well than it should, so that it takes more power to push the aircraft, or more fuel to keep the engines up to the mark, then crossing the North Atlantic could be impossible for the Concorde. That is, unless the airlines and the government regulatory bodies behind them are prepared to compromise on the size of the fuel reserve that any aircraft is required to carry for possible diversion to another airport. In lay language, this would be translated as cutting safety margins, and many therefore be politically unacceptable.

The two governments need the result of these trials before they can know what sort of Concorde they have on their hands, or whether it is even worth discussing a modification. The airlines would cordially support them if they did think of changes. It would save the airlines from having to decide how to pay for so expensive an aircraft during that period of the mid-1970s when most of them will be staggering from the losses they are going to make on jumbos until the traffic catches up with the new capacity. Some airlines will simply not be able to, a fact that must cut sales of Concorde. What airlines would most like is that the present Concorde design be treated as a prototype for a bigger 200-seater; the latter would then not be ready until, at a guess, 1976, as against a probable 1974 for the aircraft in its present form. To make the decision easy for the two governments, the airlines might, with arm-twisting, take perhaps 40 of the present Concordes: just as they took a small version of the original 707 from Boeing 13 years ago, in order to ease the introduction to jets. This is a let-out that should be seriously considered after June 18th.

* The Protection of the Environment. Cmd 4373.

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PAGE

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CPYRGHT

AID Confirms Its Use As CIA Cover in Laos

CPYRGHT

By William N. Curry

Washington Post Staff Writer

The head of the U.S. foreign aid program confirmed yesterday that CIA agents use the civilian aid mission in Laos as a cover for anti-Communist operations, much to his displeasure.

But he asserted that Laos "is the only place in the world" where CIA operatives masquerade as field workers of the Agency for International Development (AID).

AID Administrator John A. Hannah, asked if the CIA uses the mission in Laos as a cover, said: "Well, I just have to admit that this is true. This was a decision that was made back in 1962 and by administrations from now until then,

and it is the only place in the world that we are."

He said, "We have had people that have been associated with the CIA and doing things in Laos that were believed to be in the national interest but not routine AID operations.

"Our preference is to get rid of this kind of operation."

Previously, the aid agency has declined to comment on published reports that CIA agents pose as AID rural development workers but actually recruit and train anti-Communist guerrillas, detect enemy movements and act as ground controllers for air strikes.

The 1962 Geneva Convention declared Laos a neutral country.

Hannah's remarks were made on the Metromedia radio news program "Profile."

See HANNAH, A6, Col. 5

Hannah said he hopes the connection between the two agencies could be eliminated in a proposed revamping of AID. The separation was one recommendation of a recent task force that studied AID.

"I am sure that it is going to be in the President's recommendations for discussion," he said. "I hope it is going to be in the legislation once that is submitted."

Hannah conceded that the Vietnamese police officers for AID role in Laos, plus its war-related activities in Vietnam, the Ngo Dinh Diem regime, "might" have an adverse effect on the AID programs to run by the CIA. The program turned out to be other nations. "It certainly has not helped . . . It distorts the role of AID," he said. But he defended the original decisions to involve AID as being correct when they were made in 1962.

Hannah, who joined AID in 1969, said President Nixon "places a high priority" on the foreign aid program and expressed hope that the Senate will restore recent House-made cuts in AID's budget request for the coming fiscal year.

Official Confirms Aid Unit Conceals C.I.A. Role in Laos

CPYRGHT

WASHINGTON, June 7 (AP).—Dr. John A. Hannah, director of the Agency for International Development, acknowledged today that the United States aid program was being used as a cover for operations of the Central Intelligence Agency in Laos.

He said President Nixon might propose divorcing such intelligence work from overseas economic assistance in the future in proposals on foreign-aid reform to be sent to Congress.

"Well, I just have to admit that that is true," Mr. Hannah said when asked if his agency's economic aid "is being used as a cover for C.I.A. operations in Laos." He was questioned on the Metromedia radio news program "Profile."

Mr. Hanah made it clear that he disapproved of the C.I.A.'s use of his agency. He said Laos was the only country in which this was being done and that it stemmed from a 1962 decision that such activity was in the national interest.

Central Intelligence Agency provision of logistical support for the neutralist Government in Vientiane was reported in the past, and Senator J. W. Fulbright, the Arkansas Democrat who is chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has accused the C.I.A. of exceeding its authority in supporting United States military activities in Laos.

Mr. Nixon described United States aid to Laos in a statement March 6 but did not mention any Central Intelligence Agency role.

It is unusual for an executive-branch official to acknowledge publicly that his organization is being used for undercover work abroad.

CIA Reportedly Maims Its Dead on Lao Patrols

CPYRGHT

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star

CPYRGHT

VIENTIANE — Bodies of American Central Intelligence Agency operatives killed in ground combat operations in northeast Laos are maimed as much as possible to prevent the North Vietnamese from using them as tangible proof of U.S. ground presence in the area, well informed Lao sources say.

"The Americans have orders they must not be captured. If they are killed, other members of their patrol put a grenade on their face or shoot them up with their machine guns till they can't be recognized," the sources said.

There are 10 American commando teams of 8 to 10 men each operating in northeast Laos, the sources said. The teams operate behind North Vietnamese lines.

Encounter Laotians First

"When the North Vietnamese launch a big attack, they come against the Laotians first. The Lao escape around the flanks to the rear leaving the North Vietnamese facing Thais or Meo tribesmen," the sources said. "American and Thai teams infiltrate the rear, hitting enemy headquarters and communications."

The Americans and Thais operate from a small, secret and tightly guarded airfield near the U.S.-supported guerrilla headquarters at Long

Chien, 75 miles northeast of here.

There are now 1,000 Thais, including artillery and infantrymen, in northeast Laos operations, according to the sources.

U.S. sources refuse to say how many Americans are involved in the military operations.

Sources Become Edgy

They become extremely edgy when asked if the number of American military personnel in Laos has increased since the U.S. Senate subcommittee hearings on Laos last October.

Lao military sources say a further increase in U.S. military aid is coming.

The United States is being asked to supply helicopters and U.S. crews for a new "elite" airmobile unit to be formed from Lao paratroops and other units.

The Lao request follows a worsening in the over-all military situation here.

"Militarily, the Lao are in the worst position they have ever been since 1964," reliable sources say.

In northern Laos, the Plain of Jars is ringed by North Vietnamese units offering a tight defense against the guerrillas.

The North Vietnamese still are pressuring the guerrilla bases at Long Chien and Sam Thong and are to launch new attacks when the monsoon rains begin, probably this month.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, June 4, 1970

F 7

Laos Could Become Second Cambodia

CPYRGHT

By Jack Anderson

The ouster of Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk has stirred up plots in Laos to dump Prince Souvanna Phouma and set up a Cambodian-style military government. This could repeat the Cambodian crisis all over again in Laos, with dangerous consequences for the U.S.

Intelligence reports warn that rightist Laotian leaders have been encouraged by the Cambodian experience to attempt a similar takeover in their country. They are weary of the aging Souvanna Phouma who, like Sihanouk, has put on a show of outward neutrality. But just as Sihanouk permitted secret incursions by the North Vietnamese, Souvanna Phouma allowed the Americans to operate in Laos.

The Kremlin had promised both leaders that the North Vietnamese would leave their countries after the Vietnam War was settled. But as the encroachments increased, the two princes lost faith in the Soviet promise and concluded that the North Vietnamese would never clear out voluntarily.

Souvanna Phouma turned

increasingly to the U.S. to save Laos from the Communist crunch. But Sihanouk flew to Moscow and Peking to enlist support in getting the North Vietnamese out of Cambodia. While he was on this mission, he was deposed by the generals he left behind. Now he has joined the same forces, ironically, that he had tried to remove.

Secret Understanding

Washington and Moscow reached a secret understanding, meanwhile, to keep still about the U.S. intervention in Laos. As long as the U.S. didn't officially acknowledge its clandestine operations, the Kremlin agreed to ignore them.

The Russians, as they had promised Sihanouk and Souvanna Phouma, also guaranteed there would be no North Vietnamese takeover of Laos and Cambodia. Both the Soviet and Americans agreed to endeavor, at least, to confine the war to South Vietnam.

At no time did the U.S. wish to expand the Vietnam conflict into a full-scale Indochina war. Restricting the battlefield to South Vietnam, however, also had advantages

for the Communists. It meant that the U.S. could never really win the war. For it is impossible to defeat an enemy who can escape across the border into sanctuaries.

In 1964, the North Vietnamese began enlarging their sanctuary privileges in Laos by attacking the Plain of Jars and increasing the infiltration down the Ho Chi Minh spider-web of trails.

The U.S. countered by stepping up its clandestine activities and bombing the infiltration routes. After the bombing of North Vietnam was halted in 1968, the U.S. simply moved the sorties across the border and concentrated the full fury upon Red targets in Laos.

CIA Secret Army

The Central Intelligence Agency, meanwhile, has subsidized a secret army in Laos under Gen Vang Pao, a vulgar ex-French Army sergeant, whose 14,000 fighting men have been recruited largely from the minority Meo tribes.

The secret army is headquartered at the multi-million-dollar CIA base of Long Cheng. A steady stream of Air America and Continental Air Services planes, under CIA

and AID contracts, haul food, munitions and the monthly payroll for Vang Pao's troops.

Stories have now leaked out about his clandestine army, describing it accurately as the only effective fighting force in Laos on the American side. Yet my reporter in Indochina, Les Whitten, reports from Vientiane:

"The sad fact is that all the millions expended upon Vang Pao's mercenaries have not convinced one responsible U.S. official in Saigon or Vientiane that this land of 2.8 million people can be defended for more than a few weeks by the secret army against a determined Communist attack."

"The Communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese control half of Laos and clearly could take over the other half almost at will."

Whitten adds that "the fabled CIA forces, which liberal senators regard as some kind of powerful presence in Laos, are made up, in fact, of time servers, a few brilliant intelligence men and a larger number of ex-servicemen who are as harassed as any Washington bureaucrats simply trying to carry out routine duties." © 1970, Bell-McClure Syndicate, Inc.

June 1, 1970

The Telephone: Sharp blows with the flat hand are delivered simultaneously to both ears. This causes a loss of balance, impairment of hearing, as well as severe pain.

Sexual abuse: In most cases the documents declare that the prisoners are stripped of their clothes at the initiation of the interrogation. Humiliation is an obvious element in the psychological aspect of the torture. The genitals of both men and women receive considerable attention in beatings and the administration of electric shocks. Women prisoners are often violated by torturers or are turned over to police or soldiers of lower rank for their amusement. Male prisoners are sometimes forced to witness the sexual abuse of their wives, children or fiancées.

Simulated execution: Prisoners have been taken from sessions of torture or awakened during a brief respite and brought before a firing squad armed with blanks or empty rifles. Others have been drowned in buckets of water and then revived. And still others have been hung and then cut down after losing consciousness.

This list is not a complete catalog of all of the tortures described in the available documentation. It is, however, a compilation of those mentioned most frequently by the victims.

As might be expected under such circumstances, increasing numbers of Brazilians are leaving their homeland to seek refuge in other countries. Many of them are faced with almost insurmountable difficulties: improper or incomplete travel documents, insufficient financial resources, hostile military regimes in several of the nearest countries. (The best estimates available at this time are about 500 in Chile, 1300-1500 in Uruguay and approximately 2,000 in Paris, many of whom are students uncertain that they can safely return to Brazil. Large numbers are in other countries, including the U.S., but the figures are unavailable since many of them fear to declare themselves refugees.) Although the exodus grows each day and the potential for future refugees is tremendous, international refugee organizations have done little to respond to the needs of the victims of this new situation.

Massive efforts, not unlike those made on behalf of the Jews and others from Europe and Cubans in the early 1960's may now have to be made on behalf of Brazilians. The first step of such a response is now being organized by a group of individuals from the religious, academic, professional and artistic fields in New York City. (For information, write: The Editor, Christianity and Crisis.)

HOW THE UNITED STATES FITS IN

All of this information and documentation of torture and repression becomes even more disturbing when the extent of continuing U.S. Government and business involvement in Brazil is recognized. Very little open criticism has been forthcoming from these two institutions regarding the course of events of the past six years and particularly of recent months.

When the coup occurred in 1964 Ambassador Lincoln Gordon received it with open satisfaction. He said it was "perhaps as significant to the defense of the Free World as the Sino-Soviet split and the success of the Marshall Plan." Through his influence Washington recognized the military regime within 24 hours.

Significantly, the Agency for International Development increased its expenditures in Brazil from \$15.1 million in 1964 to \$122.1 million in 1965. It has proposed a \$187 million program for 1970. In addition, the US military has maintained the largest of its Latin American missions in Brazil, with over 100 advisers on the staff. The Military Assistance Program provided \$24.9 million in 1967 and \$19.4 million in 1968. Between 1964

and 1968 2,255 military men passed through its training program.

The one brief (four-month) interruption in US support occurred after the closing of Congress in 1968. Some observers believe that aid and assistance were restored quickly because of the inconvenience caused to US business and banks by the suspension. US investment there accounts for \$1,326 million of the \$7,314 million invested in all of South America.

This article is not intended to be sensational. Its purpose is, rather, to awaken American Christians and public opinion to this horrendous terror and inhumanity. The authorities of Brazil are concerned about their image abroad, and especially in the United States, from which they receive massive foreign aid and investment capital. International outcries may not bring democracy back to Brazil, but it may force the Government to restrict its present policies in the treatment of political prisoners.

Regardless of what its impact in Brazil may be, we must not—cannot—any longer allow our Government and business to quietly support a type of government that we—and prior to certain recent erosions of our own civilization in the past at least—have regarded as contrary to our way of life. What Brazil does is ultimately her own problem: what we do to support, and thereby encourage, her dehumanizing policy of repression is our problem. Brazil—a nation that has made significant contributions to international culture—may be losing the respect of the nations of the world, but we can only wonder how much greater is her loss than ours.

[From the Washington Post, May 4, 1970]
THE BRAZILIAN CHURCH MAY BE CHRISTIAN
AFTER ALL

(By Colman McCarthy)

No doubt exists any longer that the military men running Brazil are stylists in torture, violence and hounding. Too many reports from reliable witnesses have appeared in the North American and European press for anyone to think that the current oppression is merely a lapse in taste by Gen. Emilio Medici and his six-year-old government. The aim of the torture, backed by the same kind of secret police tactics used in Germany, Spain, Portugal and Italy in an earlier era and in Greece, Haiti, South Africa and Rhodesia today, is to keep the opposition silent, afraid and in view.

The students, journalists, professors, labor organizers, social workers, priests and others who are among the potential targets of torture in Brazil have been put in a strained stance. Do they resist by fighting violence with counter-violence? Or do they hold out and work for the peaceful revolution that their country, crushed by poverty, disease and illiteracy, desperately needs?

Large numbers are now joining both groups. But many who go for the second do so because much of the leadership in the Catholic Church is both vocal and risk-taking in opposing the military dictators. "Surprisingly," writes Prof. Ralph Della Cava of Queen's College, N.Y., in last week's Commonweal, "the Brazilian Catholic Church, once a mainstay of the status quo, has emerged for a variety of reasons as the only national institution that remains capable of defending the principles of freedom, justice and social change in the face of government repression."

The church in Brazil, as elsewhere in Latin America, has long been a sleeping partner of the rich and the military. Officially, it passed out the sacraments and rites, a coin-machine operation from which blessings dropped like candies on which the poor were meant to suck for comfort, not thirst for change. Unofficially, it was the chaplain church, blessing the landowners who vir-

tually enslaved the poor by forcing many of them to live on less than \$350 a year. The self-cowed clergy dared not defy the army or the rich, fearing economic pressures on religious hospitals, schools and parishes.

A few years ago, from northeast Brazil, a small, slim man with a strong clear mind spoke out, quickly to become a Martin Luther King figure to the Brazilian social movement. Since then, Archbishop Helder Camara has been rattling the generals, exposing the rich, but perhaps most important, making it clear to the poor that they have a right to something better and there is a way to get it. Last October 2, the centennial of Gandhi, Camara outlined the theme of his movement called Action, Justice and Peace. "Many Latin American governments, perhaps without realizing and without caring, are preparing an explosion worse than the nuclear bombs, worse than the H-bomb: it is the M-bomb, the bomb of misery. (This explosion) is prepared by those who cower before the powerful and the privileged and make a show of elaborate reforms and ways to execute them, but who afterward leave the situation as it is to see if it won't take care of itself."

In calling for non-violent, structural reforms in Brazil, Camara is labeled a Communist by the right, a standard dismissal of anyone who fights a little too hard for the poor. From the far left, Camara gets it also, because he insists on non-violence. He is firm about the latter, not just from his pacifism, but also practicality. "If there was a movement of violence here, Brazil would be crushed immediately, either by the United States . . . or by the USSR. To change one for the other of those two powers would all be the same, as neither of the two serve for Brazilians."

Lumping together America and Russia is not Camara's exclusive idea. In October 1968, the moderate newspaper, *Jornal do Brasil*, expressed what observers say is a widespread sentiment: "Russians and North Americans proceed as if they were invaders from Mars. They are of another race, another civilization. This planet is a colony which they exploit shamelessly and whose inhabitants—us—as the inferior beings that we are, can continue dying of hunger in our sun-baked and noisy craters."

Gen. Medici and his terrorists know better than to jail, torture or otherwise silence Camara. He is too well known internationally and too revered locally. But the government moves in on less prominent clergy. Last December, a military court indicated the bishop of Volta Redonda on charges of "subversion." Fifteen of his priests were also brought up on charges. Their trial, like the bishop's is pending, with no date set. Other priests have been imprisoned and tortured, as well as many nuns and laymen. Forcefully, one bishop, Joao Costa, recently denounced the government's treatment of political prisoners: The latter "have been violently beaten and tortured. I am making this denunciation so that there shall be eliminated once and for all from all investigations, those procedures which dishonor all those who practice them and render the process of justice suspect."

All of this puts the Vatican on the spot. It has 245 bishops in what is the world's most Catholic country—at least nominally Catholic, which means making Mass perhaps twice a year. The Pope, who has received a report called "Terror and Torture in Brazil," knows he cannot play it safe much longer—or as Pius XII did during Hitler's Germany, play it silent. The Vatican naturally supports non-violent reform. But preached from across an ocean, this stance risks becoming an accomplice to the current economic and political structures that also do violence—not by bullets or thumbscrews, perhaps, but by keeping the poor in their poverty through unjust

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laws or by letting greedy land-owners continue to hoard the land. Many in the Third World are beginning to believe that this kind of violence is infinitely more criminal than the war games played by Che-style guerrillas.

The Brazilian generals, like the Greek colonels, are touchy about their image in the United States and work hard to keep it polished; this is where the massive foreign aid and private investment capital comes from, with bad days to come were the well to run dry.

But the U.S. should be less of a worry to the Brazilian government than the Church. American businessmen will not likely pull back their money and investments so long as the generals say they are devoted to "stopping communism." The Church—or at least that part of it exemplified by Helder Camara and a growing number of bishops and thousands of clergy and laymen—sees through the big talk about anti-communism. That is not the real battle. "When will we be able to show everybody," said Camara last fall, "that the number one problem is not the clash between East and West, but between North and South—that is, between the developed world and the underdeveloped world? When will we be able to help everybody understand that misery is the enslaver, the assassin par excellence and that it is the war against misery which should be the number one and only war upon which we must focus our energy and resources?"

Camara doesn't know the answer to his questions. But he does know his country seethes with the poor and the hungry who demand answers soon. Christianity, which has solved the problems of the next world seems ready, at least in Brazil, to begin solving some of the problems of this world.

[From the Washington Post, May 13, 1970]
NEW BRAZIL PURGE HITS 10 SCIENTISTS

(By Leonard Greenwood)

RIO DE JANEIRO.—Brazil's small scientific community is reeling from its second political purge in a year.

Ten scientists, including several known internationally, have been fired from the Oswaldo Cruz Institute here and stripped of their political rights.

A government spokesman said the decision had been made by President Emilio Garrastazu Medici after "careful investigation" had shown the scientists to be "agents of subversion and enemies of the regime."

The withdrawal of their political rights makes it virtually impossible for them to continue scientific work in Brazil. Anyone who loses his rights is forbidden to work for any government-supported organization and there are almost no private laboratories.

Less than a year ago, between 60 and 70 scientists were fired from research, technical and teaching posts and some also lost their political rights.

In Brazil, which has a scientific community of only about 5,000 in a population of 94 million, the effects of last year's purge was psychologically staggering.

"People were just beginning to settle down again after that when this latest blow fell," one Brazilian scientist said. "All the old fears have been awakened again. People are saying there are more lists. God knows who'll be next."

The director of the Cruz Institute, Guilherme Lacorte, is reluctant to discuss the case, which he describes as "one of those things that happens." He says only that the departure of the 10 men need not affect the working of the institute.

The victims, who are in an extremely vulnerable situation with accusations of subversion hanging over them, refuse to meet reporters.

The men were reported to be carrying out work on many diseases. The institute,

founded at the beginning of the century, has made important contributions to world medicine, especially in the field of yellow fever.

Brazilian scientists say it is difficult to see how any of them could be accused of subversion. None was working on a job even remotely connected with national security.

As is the case with most of Brazil's scientific community, all 10 are known to have liberal ideas about society. "You'd have to stretch imagination a long way to seem them as Communists," one eminent Brazilian scientist said.

Other scientists ridicule Lacorte's statement. They say the 10 men were key figures in a small team of high-level researchers at Cruz. Without them, they add, some departments, including physiology and entomology, may have to close, the scientific standing of the institute will be damaged and Brazilian research in certain fields will be retarded.

TRIBUTE TO THE HONORABLE JOHN W. McCORMACK

— SPEECH OF

HON. JOHN C. KLUCZYNSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 26, 1970

Mr. KLUCZYNSKI. Mr. Speaker, it is indeed a real pleasure for me to join in this warm and glowing tribute to our beloved Speaker, JOHN W. McCORMACK, who will retire from public life at the end of this Congress. His departure from this House will sadden us, his colleagues, his constituents, and his legion of friends throughout the country and the world.

He has been a Speaker who helped sustain the Republic during its recent, trying years. The cries for and against seniority, the cries for and against a more partisan form of government, the cries for and against a more "liberal" or a more "conservative" path of policy—all of these cries and counter-cries could only have been met and subsumed under the sort of moderate and enlightened leadership which JOHN McCORMACK brought to the House of Representatives during his tenure as Speaker. He has acted as this country's physician-in-residence to bind up political wounds. He has been the kind of man mentioned in the beatitudes:

Blessed are the peace-makers, for they shall see God.

JOHN McCORMACK was a poor, Irish boy who helped support his widowed mother by selling newspapers on the streets of South Boston. He grew up in a hard school to become a member of his State's house of representatives and its senate, and a Member of the U.S. House of Representatives during the 70th to 91st Congresses. He became Democratic majority leader under his great mentor and friend, the late Sam Rayburn, during the 79th Congress, and Speaker of the House upon the death of Mr. Rayburn in 1961.

His honorary degrees, awarded by such institutions as Tufts College and Georgetown University, are numerous. His honors include the Order of Malta First Class and the Order of Saint Gregory. JOHN McCORMACK, as a man and as a legislator, has, during a long and productive

lifetime, well served his country and his faith.

We salute him, in a troubled and changing period, as a man who held back waves of irresponsibility so that we could achieve needed changes behind the dike of constitutional order. He takes with him into retirement the gratitude of his brothers in this House and the people of the United States.

Speaker McCORMACK, I wish you and Mrs. McCormack the greatest possible happiness and good health in the years ahead after your retirement.

Love

PRIEST TELLS OF COMMUNIST BRUTALITY IN LAOS

HON. RICHARD H. ICHORD

— OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 1, 1970

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Speaker, we have heard a great deal of sound and fury from the Senate about the presence of 300 or so American military attachés in the little landlocked nation of Laos. We heard a great deal less about the presence there of more than 65,000 North Vietnamese.

We heard a great deal about alleged American casualties inadvertently caused when American planes flew in support of Laotian forces trying to keep their country from being overwhelmed by the North Vietnamese Communists. But we heard very little of coldblooded, purposeful, indiscriminate murder of civilians by North Vietnamese and Laotian Communists.

Therefore, I would like to bring to your attention this recent account in the St. Louis Globe Democrat of the experiences of a Catholic priest who has spent 14 years in Laos and tried recently to describe Communist terrorism and murder to a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees.

Father Matt Menger says he expects to die in Laos. He says 15 of his fellow priests have been murdered by the Communists. But he says that of 11 witnesses, only the testimony of one was published in a Washington, D.C., newspaper—one concerning indiscriminate American bombing. The other 10, Father Menger says, stressed that U.S. bombing was not indiscriminate. He states that Communist-inflicted casualties were far more numerous than any caused by U.S. intervention.

The account in full follows:

SAYS REDS KILLED 15 COLLEAGUES—PRIEST TELLS OF MURDERS IN LAOS
(By Allan Hale)

Father Matt Menger expects to die in Laos. Since 1960, he says, 15 of his colleagues have been murdered by the Communists.

He stood unnoticed and silent Friday at the rear of a crowded hall at St. Louis University while students talked of the future of ROTC and black students took over the meeting to present a list of demands.

A missionary priest who has been in Laos 14 years, he had never seen a militant student gathering before. He was in St. Louis on a visit after testifying at a Senate hearing in Washington Thursday.

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Leaving the student meeting at Busch Memorial Center he walked away across the campus, a tall, lean man indistinguishable from other priests crossing the walks.

He was silent for a long time. Once he burst out: "We don't have a university in Laos. Not one. If only we had a university. We wouldn't burn it down."

He fell silent again for several minutes, then "I wouldn't have believed it. I'm glad I saw it. Otherwise, I wouldn't have believed it."

He had heard of the St. Louis University meeting by chance and had gone to listen, not to participate. "It is not my university," he said carefully . . . "and I know more about the problems of Laos than I do those of America."

He had been summoned to a hearing Thursday conducted by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, on civilian war casualty problems in Indochina.

He did not think, he said Friday, that the committee had liked his answers to questions.

"I stated, when Sen. Kennedy was pressing me about the casualties, I stated just one little example of 15 civilians I knew very well. I've lived with these men for some years, who were actually murdered by the Communists—15 Catholic priests. We are only 100 in the whole country, but they have killed 15, not in any bombing or village-shelling but in cold blood."

Still talking of the Senate committee hearing, Father Menger went on:

"Of the 11 witnesses who testified, the testimony of only one was published, at least in the Washington Post, entitled 'Indiscriminate Bombing of Civilians in Laos Alleged'. The other witnesses, all of them, including myself, testified that the U.S. bombing in Laos was not indiscriminate. On the contrary,

"In my testimony I brought out the large number of civilians wounded and killed by the North Vietnamese in our country. The Communist-inflicted casualties were far, far more numerous than any inflicted by the American intervention."

There are believed to be 67,000 North Vietnamese troops in Laos, he said. "In addition, it is very rarely printed that there are 12,000 to 14,000 Chinese Communist troops who are building a road in Laos. The news media today stress the presence of 300 American military advisers."

President Nixon's move into Cambodia has not extended the war, he said. It had already been extended throughout the entire region by the North Vietnamese.

For years Father Menger has given Laotian villagers medical treatment for anything from malaria to wild animal bites. He has helped rebuild churches and schools and homes after the tide of war has rolled over them and organized distribution of emergency food.

They call him "The Tall Priest" in Laos, and with his fluent Lao he has interpreted at high-level conferences between American and Laotian officials. Therefore he is a marked man. He intends to return to Laos as soon as possible.

"I don't expect to live," he says calmly. "But it does not matter if I die next month, at the age of 40, with a bullet in the back of the head, or at 95 on an inner-spring mattress. I am doing something."

THE SYSTEMS APPROACH

HON. JOHN O. MARSH, JR.

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 27, 1970

Mr. MARSH. Mr. Speaker, I should like to conclude at this time my presentation of portions of a report of a pilot study of possible applications of the systems approach to the appropriations process of the Congress.

It may be recalled that this study—entirely unofficial—was undertaken by a seminar group at American University under the direction of Dr. George K. Chacko, professorial lecturer and systems scientist.

I believe this interesting voluntary effort represents a useful contribution to our current active consideration of ways in which modern informational analysis techniques might be used to improve the efficiency of the legislative branch.

The final portion of the paper pro-

duced by Dr. Chacko and his associates follows:

THE SYSTEMS APPROACH

ASSUME EACH ELEMENT HIERARCHY TO BE
EQUALLY CONSISTENT

As was mentioned earlier, no attempts were made to straight-jacket illustrative scores at the horizontal or vertical levels. The members of the Seminar had very little knowledge of the preferences that the administrative personnel of the Department of the Interior would have employed in either achieving the goals that have been set or in weighing them. Nevertheless, each Study Team Group that pursued the different hierarchical choices corresponding to the elements tried conscientiously to relate it in a responsible manner to the overall objective of averting national ecological disaster. Owing to the differences in professional and personal background, the nonfulfillment of the organicistic objectives of averting ecological disaster was given the penalty ranging from one billion to 50 billion. Assuming that the protagonist of each element was equally consistent, how would the Congressional decision-maker decide among the competing claims for the same limited resources?

SET ORGANISMIC OBJECTIVE NONFULFILLMENT
PENALTY AT 50×10^9

The preferred tactical choice in Element 1 was: Improve fire prevention/fighting techniques with a weighted penalty of 150, compared with the weighted penalty for nonfulfillment of the organicistic objective of one billion.

To make a valid comparison between the claims of this particular tactical choice and, say, the tactical choice of improving routes to more distant areas in the national forests, its weighted penalty score of 300 must be related to the corresponding penalty for nonfulfillment of not one billion but 50 billions. Although the weighted penalty score itself is twice that of the first tactical choice, the much larger base against which it has to be compared in fact reduced the resource allocation for the same. In Table 10 the organicistic objective nonfulfillment penalty is set at the highest level of 50 billion. Accordingly, the tactical choice of fire prevention/fighting techniques gets a score of 7,500 compared with only 300 for improving the roads to more distant areas.

TABLE 10.—EQUALIZING THE 5-BUDGET ELEMENT PENALTIES FOR NONFULFILLMENT:
SET ORGANISMIC OBJECTIVE NONFULFILLMENT PENALTY AT 50×10^9

1. Tactical choice: Improve fire prevention/fighting techniques: $\frac{50 \times 10^9}{1 \times 10^9} \times 150 =$	7,500	4. Tactical choice: Preserve trees by better farming: $\frac{50 \times 10^9}{10 \times 10^9} \times 90 =$	450
2. Tactical choice: Create new cities in semiwild forests: $\frac{50 \times 10^9}{8 \times 10^9} \times 50 =$	311	5. Tactical choice: State assistance for land acquisition: $\frac{50 \times 10^9}{12 \times 10^9} \times 20 =$	83
3. Tactical choice: Improve routes to more distant areas: $\frac{50 \times 10^9}{50 \times 10^9} \times 300 =$	300	Total for 5 tactical choices.....	8,644

COMPUTER PROGRAM

Once the tactical choices are each related to the organicistic objective of averting national ecological disaster, the relative allocation of resources to each can be determined on the basis of:

1. Penalty score.
2. Weighted penalty.
3. Organicistic level penalty.

The change by the Congressional decision-maker of the organicistic objectives would change the organicistic level penalties and corresponding tactical level penalty scores. Should the agencies of the Government change the number and/or importance of alternative strategic and tactical choices to accomplish the organicistic objective, that would be reflected in the penalty scores and/or penalty levels by hierarchy.

It bears repetition that:

1. The Congressional decision-maker decides what the organicistic objectives should be, and can change them;

2. The agencies of the Government decide upon the best means of accomplishing the organicistic objectives and can change them.

In this study, there are 14 tactical choices identified as competing for the achievement of the overall objective. They are listed in Table 11. The weighted penalty scores for the 14 tactical choices together came to 80,712.

TABLE 11

I. Avert ecological disaster.....	100
II. Improve the environment.....	80

ELEMENT 1. FOREST PROTECTION UTILIZATION

Improve fire prevention/fighting techniques.
Prevent strip mining.

Prevent strip logging.

ELEMENT 2. ACQUISITION OF LAND

Create new cities in semiwild forests.
Move to suburban areas with civil systems electronic products.

ELEMENT 3. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

Improve routes to more distant areas.
Education of the public on fire protection.
Demonstration of effects of violating environmental ethic.

ELEMENT 4. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

Preserve trees by better farming.
Establish criteria on fossil fuels (e.g. oil) mining.

Improve seed inventory replenishment to restore land.

ELEMENT 5. BUREAU OF OUTDOOR RECREATION

State assistance for land acquisition.

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State assistance to acquisition of urban land for recreation.

State assistance to acquisition of industrial land for recreation.

As a first approximation, consider that the 14 tactical choices are the only measures open to the Department of the Interior to accomplish the organicistic objective. In that case, improved fire prevention/fighting techniques with its score of 7,500 claims 24.2% of the total budget.

Similarly, prevent strip mining with its score of 9,500 claims 30.0% of the total budget allocation, and so on.

For illustrative purposes, a simplified computer program was written, and the budgetary allocation based on these hypothetical hierachic objectives was made for both FY 1970 and FY 1971.

CREED

Turning now from the tactical choices open to the pursuit of the organic objective to their logical groupings, what can be said about the 14 tactical choices employed in this study?

Improving fire prevention/fighting techniques; preserving trees by better farming; and improving seed inventory replenishment clearly conserve natural resources. Similarly, prevention of strip logging, strip mining and the establishment of criteria on fossil fuel mining was designed to regulate. The education of the public on fire prevention and the demonstration of the effects of violating environmental ethics are designed to educate. The tactical choices to improve roads to more distant areas, state assistance for land acquisition in general and urban and industrial land in particular, accent the facility to enjoy. Finally the creation of cities in semi-wild forests and the move to suburban areas of electronic product industries are designed to develop the environment.

Combining the first letter of these five activities, the acronym CREED is evolved.

The Congressional decision-maker can look at the allocation of resources under each of these categories as shown in Table 12 and decide, for instance, that the allocation of 65% of resources to regulate the use of the environment may be too much and the allocation of 1.5% to facilitate the enjoyment of the environment too little. He could instruct that certain other percentages, say 37% and 25% may be more appropriate. He can ask for the decreasing of the allocation to regulatory activities from 65% to 37%, and the increase of the allocation of the facilitation of the enjoyment of the environment from 1.5% to 25%. The methodology of the present study requires the indication from the decision-maker as to where he would want to make the change, so that the total of resources to all of CREED is 100%.

TABLE 12. CREED

CONSERVE, 27.19%

Percent

Improve fire prevention/fighting techniques	24.42
Preserve trees by better farming	1.47
Improve seed inventory replenishment to restore land	1.30
REGULATE, 65.43%	
Prevent strip logging	32.55
Prevent strip mining	30.93
Establish criteria on fossil fuel (e.g. oil) mining	1.95
Educate, 4.88%	
Education of the public on fire prevention	3.74
Demonstration of effects of violating environmental ethic	1.14
ENJOY, 1.50%	
Improve routes to more distant areas	0.98
State assistance for land acquisition	0.26
State assistance to acquisition of urban land	0.13
State assistance to acquisition of industrial land	0.13

DEVELOP, 1.00%

Create new cities in semiwild forests	0.98
Move to suburban areas with civil systems electronic products	0.02

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this introductory study has been to explore the use of the systems approach to help the systematic evaluation of the budget request by the Congressional decision-makers on the Appropriations Committee. The Department of the Interior Budget figures for FY 1970 and FY 1971 were selected, and some 55% of the total budget (NOA) represented in five elements was identified for analysis.

Using the organicistic, strategic and tactical hierarchy of objectives, the five elements were associated with a single, overall objective: Averting national ecological disaster. Alternative measures of meeting this overall objective were systematically developed for each of the five elements.

A systematic comparison was made of different tactical level choices, horizontally; and also of each tactical choice with its higher level of objectives at the strategic and organicistic level, vertically.

The consequence of nonfulfillment of each of the tactical level choices upon the organicistic objective were illustratively put into numerical terms. Based upon the relationship of each tactical objective to each other and each tactical objective to the corresponding strategic and organicistic objectives, the allocations of the Interior Budget were demonstrated.

The strength of the systems approach explored with respect to the appropriate evaluation lies in the consistency of its methodology which forces the user to make explicit his hidden assumptions and values, so that alternative means of accomplishing the same objective can be identified and evaluated; and also courses and consequences corresponding to altogether different sets of overall objective themes.

A YOUNG MAN IN VIETNAM WRITES HIS PARENTS

HON. MARK ANDREWS

OF NORTH DAKOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 1, 1970

Mr. ANDREWS of North Dakota. Mr. Speaker, the war in Vietnam and the President's recent decision to send troops into Cambodia to destroy enemy concentrations have been the subjects of major controversy over the past several weeks. Everyone is hearing what the students on our campuses are saying, but too few have heard what our young men who are serving in Vietnam have to say.

I was pleased to receive a copy of a letter from Philip Foss to his mother and father, Mr. and Mrs. William Foss of Michigan, N. Dak. Philip is serving his country in Vietnam and his letter speaks for itself.

I include the letter at this point in the RECORD:

DEAR MOM AND DAD: I know you've waited a long time for this letter, and that I should have written sooner but I'll get this one in the mail.

I got both of your packages. The bread was in fine shape as was the sausage and cheese. It didn't last 20 minutes once it got here. I ate about 8 or 10 sandwiches myself and let the other fellows have the rest. It was the best sandwich I've had in nearly a year. I suppose you're wondering what is going on over here. Well, Nixon made the

best move of anyone so far. He is going to finish it. Over where you are, you don't know all that is happening, but from here, I can hear the 52's bombing in Cambodia. It sounds like drums rolling. The only way to end this is to go after them. But the main thing is that the people at home stand together whether Nixon is right or wrong. We are in Cambodia now and it's too late to back out. So we must go ahead and finish the mission and hope we have done right. In my own mind, this will be the turning point. I would have made the same decision if it were for me to decide.

My time is nearly over. It's been ten months now and they've gone fairly fast. One day I'll be walking in the door. I can't wait to eat some food again. I never gave it much thought until I didn't have it anymore. I miss all that food, vegetable soup with dumplings, chile. I could go on forever.

This is the busy time at home, I suppose. The farmers with their crops and you with insurance. When the grain is ripe, I'll see it this year.

Hope you're both in the best of health. Tell the people you finally got a letter from me. Take good care of yourselves.

Love, your son

PHILLIP.

THE HARD HATS—FOR GOD AND COUNTRY

HON. JOHN R. RARICK

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 1, 1970

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, for years I have been saying that when the American workingman becomes fed up with what is going on in our country, we can expect a change for the better.

In New York City, upward of 150,000 hard hats—workingmen—recently paraded in a show of American flags to pledge unity for our country and support for its leaders. Their shouts "All the Way U.S.A." have echoed around the world.

Now we in Washington understand that the hard hats are to come to our Nation's Capital—not to protest against but to demonstrate for the United States, for our fighting men, for our flag, and even for police officers.

I predict that when the builders—the workers of our country—start being heard we can anticipate a stiffening in the attitudes of many of the liberal-left politicians. And, when our patriotic labor Americans join forces with the farmers and the other concerned loyal Americans, along with patriotic youth, there will arise a ground swell of Americanism from the once silent majority which may yet save our country.

Mr. Speaker, I have my hard hat in my office—I, too, have heard the cry "U.S.A., All the Way."

I include several news clippings, as follow:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, May 31, 1970]

FLAG'S DEFENDERS: HARD HATS MARCH FOR A WAY OF LIFE

(By Richard Harwood)

NEW YORK.—In lower Manhattan, the flags are everywhere, little flags, taped to car antennas, overhead cranes and ice-cream carts. Big flags, whipping in the winds that blow through Wall Street. Metal flags stuck in